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In the mid-1980s,an important post-WorldWar II trend was reversed:
after decades of decline, the intensity of East Asia's intraregional trade
beganto increase,spurredbythe dramaticgrowthandwidening capabilities
of the region's economies (Petri 1993). Reinforced by the collapse of
communism, this turning pointalso markedthe end of the postwar, United
States(U.S.)-centered framework of East Asian economic relationships.
Several new effortsat regionaleconomic cooperationemergedat thattime,
and not all were hospitabletocontinued US involvement inthe region's key
policy decisions. Butdevelopments now favor an organization that is well
aligned with American interests: the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) forum,1aforward-looking,inclusivegroupingthat incorporatesEast
Asia, the United States and major trade partners in the Western Hemi-
sphere. Since its founding in 1989,APEC hasmade remarkableprogress,
and isnowembarked(atleastonpaper)onabolishingall barrierstoregional
trade and investment by the early part of the next century.
This paper argues that the United States has a vital stake in APEC
APEC providesa meansfor exploitingtrade andinvestmentgains ina huge
integrated market; it allows the United Statesto strengthen its ties with the
world's most dynamic economies and helps to create a global policy
environment that promotes liberalization.
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Despitethese importantbenefits,the Americanpublicknows littleabout
APEC, and even the U.S. government's commitment has not always been
clear. American interest has been subdued in part because the organiza-
tion's "value added" is not yet established. APEC leaders' meetings have
reached agreement mostly on general goals; the most dramatic was in
Bogor Indonesia in 1994 where they adopted the goal of "free trade and
investment in the region" by 2010 for developed countries and 2020 for
developing countries. While the 1995 Osaka meeting, which producedthe
Osaka Declaration, and the subsequent 1996 Manila meeting, which gen-
erated the Manila Action Plan for APEC (MAPA), succeeded in making
these goals somewhat more specific, neither resulted in significant region-
wide action. Those skeptical aboutAPEC's "voluntary" approach are right
to worry that a serious commitment to-implementingthe Bogor targets has.
•not yet been demonstrated.
To be sure, some concrete outcomes can be already attributed to
APEC. The United States had more positive interactions with East Asian
economies in the context of APEC than in its bilateral commercial diplo-
macy.Thesummitshave allowed the UnitedStates to discuss,andto some
extent resolve,bilateralstrains that would have beenmuch more difficult to
address in other fora. The Bogor goals remain alive, and the succeeding
summits have incrementally clarified thosegoals. The 1996Manila summit
also gave a strong sendoff to the "Information Technology Agreement,"
facilitating its adoptionin the WorldTradeOrganization (WTO) a fewweeks
later,Substantial progress appears to have been made in trade facilitation
in suchareasas customs proceduresand productstandards. Finally,some
argue that "community building" may be itself sufficient to justify APEC,
even if its economic initiatives produce modest gains beyond those that
could be achieved by other means. This was arguably the case in the first
few decades of ASEAN economic cooperation.
For the United States, working with APEC.will mean getting used to
new forms of collaboration.APEC's diverse membership hasa broader (or
seen from another perspective, narrower) agenda than economic liberali-
zation. Some Asian partners are more interested in promoting regional•PETRI AND PLUMMER: U.S.AND ASIA-PACIFIC COOPERATION 125
stability and better understanding among the region's bureaucracies, and
in satisfying their domestic public demand for "economic and technical
cooperation" than in liberalization.These objectives have been recognized
inthe Osaka Declaration,which assignedequal importanceto liberalization,
facilitation and economic and technical cooperation.
Even in the liberalization area, APEC's emerging negotiating style
differs from that of the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
rounds and other negotiations conducted by the United States in the past.
Instead of lengthy,detailed discussions leading to large, specific agree-
ments, the APEC process brings, at best, modest annual concessions in
the contextof general long-termgoals. TheAPEC "game" involvessmaller
stakes at any given time, and is played more frequently than the GATT
game. The challenge (addressed in more detail in Petri 1997),is to create
institutional mechanismsthat facilitate progress under this unusualmodel.
Somequestionsthat arise inthiscontextare:ShouldcommitmentsinAPEC
be made available to all trade partners or members only? How should one
measure the "comparability" ofdissimilar offers?Whatwill inducecountries
to make rigorousvoluntary commitments?
Inthis complexsetting, Americanleadershiphas helpedto push APEC
toward sharper positions starting with the Seattle summit, partly via the
visionary proposalsissued by the Eminent Persons' Group(EPG) ledby C.
Fred Bergsten,anAmerican. Butgiven erodingpolitical supportforregional
trade agreements as well as the absence of fasttrack authority,the United
States is no longer in a position,to offer substantive deals, which it would
need to do so as to negotiate aggressively.Instead, the United States will
have to adopt a strategy that is vigorous enough to maintain APEC's
momentum yet Subtleenough to avoid the charges of negotiating without
Congressional authorization athomeandof shapingAPECwithout making
its own contributions.126 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
THE CASE FORAPEC
America's stake inAPECcovers awide rangeof economic and political
objectives. This section examines five major rationale for a strong U.S.
commitment to APEC. It Is believed that equally strong cases could be
made for the interests of most APEC member-economiesfor the success
of the organization, but this note is purposely limited to exploring the
American perspective.
Gains from Tradeand Investment
APEC iscommitted to trade and investmentliberalization,trade facili-
tation, and economiccooperation.These will reduce transactionscosts
among,andhelptoacceleratethe integration of, someof theworld'smost
dynamiceconomies,The WorldBank(1994) estimatedthatgainsof $100
billionannuallycouldresultfrom relaxingEastAsiantradeand investment
barriers.The powerful"trade-investment nexus"ofthe 1980s---a systemof
positive feedbacksamongliberalization, investment andtrade-was critical
for East Asia's remarkable growth,and APEC could ensure that this
dynamismcontinuestospurregionwideprogress.
APEC-based liberalization islikelyto resultin largerincrementalcon-
cessionsbyEastAsiancountriesthanbythe UnitedStates,partlybecause
EastAsian barriers-arerelativelyhigh,and partlybecauseUnitedStates
hasalreadygivenupmuchofwhat EastAsia wantsinthe UruguayRound
agreements. For example, the United States is committedto eliminate
textileand clothingquotaswellbefore the Bogordeadline(althoughtariffs
will remain significant).At the same time, liberalizationin APEC could
reduce agricultural and service barriers--fields not rigorously covered by
GATT and in which the United States hascomparative advantage.
Of course, similar benefitscould be achieved by pursuing multilateral
liberalization inthe broaderframework of GATTand the VVTO.Butcompre-
hensive global negotiations are not likely to resume soon, given the chal-
lenges involved incompleting and implementingthe Uruguay Round,and
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(Bergsten 1996). In this more specialized context, the rapidly growing
Pacificregion providesan excellentvenue for making progress beyondthe
achievements of the Uruguay Round.In some cases, this progress can be
also developedintoglobal agreementswithin theWTO.Theseopportunities
are likelyto beexploitedby some groupof Pacificcountries, whether or not
the United States participates.
Strengthening Linkageswith Dynamic East Asia
Accumulated experience and a wide range of supporting institutions
are needed todo businesseffectively in a particularforeign economy.2The
momentum of international linkages depends on a variety of supporting
functions (for example, in financing transactions, hedging currency risks,
facilitating legaltransactions, evaluating businessopportunities) aswell as
low natural and policy barriers to trade (such as good transport and
communication links,stable exchange rates,and low tariffs). Governments
can play an important role in ensuring that strong foundations are in place
for economic linkages with the "right" partners, such as the dynamic
economies of EastAsia.
The idea that governments can shape the direction of trade ("trade
follows the flag") is not new,and appears frequently in APEC dialogues.3
For example, a key architect of the Bush administration's Asia policies
.argued forcefully for APEC by noting that "when the American West was
settled in the 19th century, the location of railroads and telegraph lines
establishedpatternsof migration, investment,growth and influence. Simi-
larly,the type of telecommunicationssystems,the air routes,the languages
spoken,where students go to school, and other such decisions today will
determine the U.S.-transPacific engagement of tomorrow.''4This presents
an important rationale for U.S. engagement in East Asia today, and for
governmental institutionssuch as APEC that promote the relationship.
The structure of the regional organization that emerges in the current
Asia-Pacific contextwill affectthe regionalpatternofeconomic relationships
for decades to come. Should United States not pursue closer cooperation
through APEC, another regional grouping might emerge--without thei
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UnitedStates.Indeed,it hasbeenarguedinEastAsiathatthe region should
"delink" its economy from sluggish North America. But North American
markets are too lucrative, even if they grow slowly. The U.S. market is
tailor-made for East Asian producers because it has many high-income
buyerswith a taste for cutting-edge products. It is also a large,accessible
market which hasconsistently maderoom for new productsand exporters.
Interms of the "flying geese" analogy,there isnocomparable "lead goose"
within EastAsia itself.5
Gaiatsu Effects
Additional benefitsderive from the effect of regional pressures on the
domestic policymaking processes of APEC member-countries. Foreign
influence, especially when institutionalizedthrough formal mechanisms of
international cooperation, can help to offset the opposition of domestic
special interests topolicies that promotegeneral nationalinterests. Forthis
reason, domestic policymakers frustrated by interest group politics often
welcome such pressure from the outside.(Gaiatsu, the Japanese word for
foreign pressure particularly from the United States, is often used with a
positive connotation by Japanese economists..)
From the U.S.viewpoint, APEC-wide agreements could offera substi-
tute for bilateral trade pressure. A regional influence may be especially
useful in those Asian economies where central leadership is weak and
special interests play a large role in the decisionmaking process. In such
economies, the roles of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
World Bank (WB) have been often justified with the gaiatsu theory. And
similar arguments have been applied even in large and independent-
minded countries such as the United States. For example, the Clinton
administration has sold unpopular domestic policies (e.g., the financial
rescue of .Mexico) by arguing that they are necessary for maintaining
international economic order. External pressure may be especially impor-
tant for strengthening reforms in countries such as China, Mexico and
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Ratchet Effects
Benefits may bealsoassociatedwith theeffect ofAPECon the political
economy ofglobaltrade and investmentliberalization.The EPGhasargued
that countries excluded from regionalagreements are stimulated to partici-
pate in globaltrade agreements. Presumably,the economic rationaleisthat
in the absence of freer global trade, they fear that preferentialagreements
will divert trade to intraregional sources. In this view, the 1993 Seattle
meetings of APEC played precisely such a role in eliciting European
concessions needed for agreement on the Uruguay Round. If APEC were
to reachnew regional agreementsto liberalizetrade and investment,these
might then set the stage for extending these agreements by accepting
individualeconomies that offer reciprocalbenefits,or by providing aframe-
work for a new round of global negotiations.
The ratchet theory appears in both EPG reports. However, in the
second report, the argument isconsiderablyweakened: each country can
decide whether to apply regional agreements only to APEC partners or to
all countries on a most-gavored nation (MFN) basis. If many countries
followed an MFN approach, the incentive to offer reciprocal concessions
would be much weaker. Little is known about how well the ratchet theory
works in practice. Small countries (such as India) that have little leverage
on an emerging preferential area would surely like to join, but large
competingblocs (such as the European Union) mighttake a more confron-
tational approach.
A more subtle version of the ratchet theory is that potential global
agreements can be given momentumthrough discussions in and support
from APEC. The information Technology Agreement (ITA) is a model for
this case;other "earlysector liberalization" measuresare under discussion
for future APEC action. The argument is that APEC countries have a
narrower rangeof intereststhan the world asa whole, and APEC canmore
easilyhammerout a,coordinatedpositiononspecificglobaltrade proposals.
With this important critical mass, the agreement then has a better chance
in global fora.Whether or not this happened in the ITAis not entirely clear;
some APEC negotiators argue that it did, but then some APEC countries130 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
remained publicly skeptical about the agreement even in the Singapore
WTO summit where it was ultimatelyadopted.
Balance of Power
Not all rationale for APEC rest on economics. In the absence of a
communist threat,some fear that the United Stateswill reduce its political
and military commitments in EastAsia, leaving behind a struggle among
the region's largepowers.The UnitedStates,in turn,hasa powerful interest
in the economic stability of East Asia, the site of three devastatingwars in
this century. Stability and security were repeatedly cited as key U.S.
objectives for supporting APEC by Secretary of State Warren Christopher
in his address to the Osaka meeting.6 Former PrimeMinister Paul Keating
of Australia has called for security issues to be formally introduced in
APEC.7
Although the political landscape of East Asia is more peaceful today
than it hasbeenthroughout the lastcentury,the potentialfor conflictremains
and isincreasingly beingtakenseriously byanalystswhowatchthe growing
military power of several countries in the region. Even without an explicit
security role for APEC, the regular diplomatic contacts the organization
makes may possibly help to anticipate and diffuse East Asian tensions.
APEC plays a useful role in supporting dialogue under the newly-estab-
lishedASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). In addition, economic negotiations
through APEC can be combined (whether officially admitted or not)!with
political discussions to provide a richer menufor collaboration.
WORKING WITH APEC
Towork effectively inAPEC, the United States will needto understand
and adapt to its unique institutional features. APEC is a young institution
with a diverse membership, and it has not yet reachedconsensus on how
it will coordinate the policies of its members.Although most members see
cooperation through APEC as.beneficial, few regard it as a key instrument
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States) appear willing to take small, repeated steps, but have not yet
committedthemselvesto seriousconcessions. The challengeis to build
institutions thatencouragethesesmallstepstoadd up.
One important faultlineishowmuchrelativeattentionshouldbegiven
to APEC's "three pillars"-- liberalization,facilitationand economicand
technicalcooperation. WhileAsianmemberswouldprefermoreemphasis
on the "ecotech" pillarthan it has receivedso far, it is not easy to find
initiatives thatmeetthedefinitions thatAPEChasadopted(thatis,activities
in this area shouldinvolverelativelyequal partnerships and shouldnot
requiresignificant financialtransfers).
Anotherfaultlineconcernsthe formalityof APEC agreements.Some
countries,includingthe UnitedStates, have favoredformal negotiations
leadingtobindingagreements,whileothershavearguedfor largelyvolun-
•tary measures.These debates have givenrise to curious,intermediate
formulations m for example,somenowfavor"concerted,voluntary,moni-
toredconcessions."Itisunclearhowthisdiffersfrommutuallynegotiated,
bindingagreements,since concerted implies negotiated,and since all
international agreementsare ultimately voluntary.
Whatisimportant iswhethertheconcessions soughtbyAPEC aretruly




pendix.In a unilateralframework,countrieswilladoptpoliciesthat benefit
boththemselvesand theirpartners,butwill notchoosepoliciesthat are
inherentlycostlytothemselves,even iftheseyieldregionalbenefits.More
ambitiousoutcomeswilltypicallyrequirea multilateralcontext: parallel
concessionsfrom severalcountries,so that each can benefitenoughto
justify some sacrifices.Thus, the range of outcomes achievable in a
unilateralprocessis only a subsetof those achievablein a multilateral
process. 8 Initially,good progressmay be possiblewith a unilateralap-
proach,buteventuallythe needtocoordinateactionsbyseveralcountries132 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
(which will be undoubtedly necessary for the full implementation of the
Bogor Declaration) will become increasingly important.
Against this background,the 1996 Manilameetings represented a first
step in working out the implications of cooperation through APEC for
individual countries. The mission was to create an "action plan" or imple-
mentation agenda for the goals worked out at Bogor and Osaka. Whether
or not thiswas really accomplishedisopen toquestion. Thefact that MAPA
exists is in itself somethingof anaccomplishment.A technical and unglam-
orous document, MAPA's1,500pages describe hundreds of individual and
collective steps and make the APEC processmuch more transparent than
it has been so far.
MAPA does include significant "gold nuggets." Someexamples follow:
Brunei, Chile, Hong Kong,New Zealand and Singapore promised
to eliminate tariffs while China, Indonesia, Philippines and others
offered sizable reductionswith definite timetables;
Korea, Philippines,Taipeiand others committed fundamentalmar-
ket opening in service sectors such as finance, insurance and
telecommunications; and
Collectively, the economies pledged to make it easier to do busi-
ness in the Pacific, through measures such as the harmonization
ofcustomsand standards, makingtariffsaccessible onthe Internet,
and improving mutual recognition of product testing.
But for the most part, MAPA is frustratingly vague. Many of the concrete
actionsthat wouldberequiredtoachieve the Bogorgoalsare not mentioned
at all, and others are scheduled only for review. Neither the United States
nor Japan offered ambitious, new commitments. As already noted, U.S.
negotiatorsviewedthe supportforthe global InformationTechnologyAgree-
ment(ITA)as the meeting's major accomplishment,sincethe endorsement
helped to lay the groundwork for the successful negotiations on the ITA in
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Taken together, how important are the accomplishments of APEC up
through 1996? Some argue that they are not very impressive,because at
this point, the action plans largely repackage steps that countries would
have taken anyway for domestic reasons to meet regional commitments,
say,within the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), or to fulfill their Uruguay
Round(UR)obligations. Inother words, littleaboutMAPAisreally "UR plus"
so far.
But a fairer test is to measure APEC's progress against its own
ambitious goal--the Bogor targets. In other words, are APEC member-
economies reducing their barriers fast enough pace the Bogor targets by
the specified years?Bythis measure,APEC isprobably"ontrack." A recent
review by the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC 1996), an
independent group of academic, business and government experts, indi-
cates that tariff reductions are at least in line with the trends required to
achieve minimaltariff levels by the Bogordeadlines (otherpolicy areasare
more difficult to quantify and the study could not conclude whether the
trends were fast enough). In addition, the study found good progress in
trade facilitation and took account of a broad range of deregulation and
privatization measures that reflect trends in the region toward market
solutions in the provisionof infrastructureservices.9For now,APEC seems
to be moving relatively fast, even if it is merely taking credit for, or reinforc-
ing, ongoing market integration policies. The value of this function should
not be underestimated, but APEC concessions will have to become more
pointed as the more difficult elements of the Bogor objectives are ap-
proached.
The leaders alsoagreed in Manilato introduceadditional concessions
in future meetings as well asestablish proceduresto review and to ensure
the comparability ofthe individualaction plansofAPEC members.With little
fanfare, APEC appears to have embarked on a negotiating process unlike
any used beforein multilateraleconomic arrangements.Ratherthanreach-
ing a complex agreement through protracted negotiations,APEC is using
the annual cycle of meetings (ideally complemented by ongoing negotia-
tions in between) to induce smaller, repeated concessions by all member-134 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
economies. Ifthis approach provessuccessful,itwillrepresent a new way
of building confidence in, and movingcloser to, regional integration. Since
early formal negotiations appear unlikely,the United States hasfew alter-
natives but to supportthis novel process.
APEC's "repeated game" strategy will require new institutions. An
•important step is to define three principal protocols for (a) specifying the
contributions expected from different members, (b) measuring the size of
the commitments offered, and (c) monitoring progress in implementation.
The novel conceptof"comparability" isa critical pieceofthe required APEC
protocol. Essentially,it aimsto set criteria for evaluating whether the offers
that APEC member-economies bring to the process are consistent with
what is expected of them. No country will make serious offers to APEC
unlessit believes that others are making similar contributions, and that its
own effortsare assessedandmonitored. InSecretary WarrenChristopher's
words:
"We do not have to take identical steps, but the steps we take
should produce comparable results. Each of us can take difficult
steps if all of us are taking difficult steps."
Sincethe contributions ofdifferenteconomieswill take manyforms, the
procedure for determining comparability will have to add up "apples and
oranges." As argued below, the procedurewill ultimately have to involve
some technical estimates, but more than economic quantification is at
stake. If the comparability problemis resolved,APEC's diverse economies
will be able to design highly-independent programs of cooperation on the
path toward Bogor. Because the independent concession packages allow
countries to sidestep domestic obstacles, theywill be able to move more
quickly than they could on a more rigid, externally determined negotiating
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A COMPARABILITY PRIMER
APEC's informalapproachto cooperation is likely to create intensive




tion,Chinaon trade liberalization, and the UnitedStateson streamlining
administrative procedures. Severalissuesariseinevaluatingand compar-
ing such differentpackages. Should quantitativemeasurement be at-
tempted? If so, what valuesor weightsshouldbe applied to individual
components ofa country's offerinordertoconstructanaggregatemeasure
of itseffort?And, howlarge an aggregateoffershouldAPEC expectfrom
each economy?Some conceptualand practicalissuesraised by these
questionsare examinedbelow,
Measure or Not?
Shouldthe comparabilityof different offersbe assessed quantitatively,
or isit enoughtojudge concessionssimplyby whetheror not they "feel
right?"Therearegoodreasonsfornot quantifyingcommitmentsi_recisely.
Measurementcould make it harderfor a country to claim for its home
constituencies thatitwontheverybestbargain.Moreover,argumentsabout
quantification couldabsorbnegotiating energiesthatare betterappliedto






2.5 to 6.25 percentof GDP annually. 1° And perhaps most importantly,
quantification couldinducegreatereffortsby countriesthat havenot con-
tributedsufficiently to theAPEC process,136 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
The best way to balancethese pros and cons is to facilitate measure-
ment, while leaving it outside the official process. Quantification "on the
sidelines" could keep measurement from becoming an issue itself. Meas-
urements could be carried out by outside academic and research organi-
zations -- perhaps in friendly competition with each other -- spurring
interest and debate, but not locking the negotiators into fruitless contro-
versy. APEC could encourage this process by makingwidely available the
raw materials needed for measurement: databasesof country policiesand
commitments.
What to Measure
Economic policy is usually evaluated in terms of economic welfare,
measured as the incomethat an economy would bewilling to trade for the
benefitsgenerated under the policy.An interesting and important issue is:
Whose welfare should be measured? In most analytical work, world eco-
nomic welfare is automatically used as the criterion for placing value on
outcomes, in order to encourage cooperation within APEC, a good case
can be madefor a narrower measure: the welfare benefitscreated for the
members ofAPEC. Specifically,inorderto evaluate howmuchan economy
has contributedto APEC,one mightlookat the effects ofits policychanges
on the welfare of other APEC countries.
A Conceptthat is closely related to the idea of partner welfare, but is
more easily measured, is that of "APEC partner value added" (APVA). By
APVA we mean the demand for value added in an APEC member-
economy,that results from the concession made by another APEC mem-
ber. This demand could result from increased imports (less direct and
indirect imports from outside APEC), increased inward or outward foreign
investment,reducedtransaction costs, or even increasedoutput or produc-
tivity made possible by economic and technical cooperation. APVA will
overstate the increase in partners' welfare, since the value added impact
of a concessionwill be offset in part by the displacement ofother (presum-
ably less productive) activities. ButAPVA iseasily understood, estimated,
and aggregated in the context of many different types of concessions.PETRI AND PLUMMER: U.S. ANDASIA-PACIFIC COOPERATION 137
The APVA criterion offersan interestingcompromisefor the debate on
whether APEC concessions should be extended on an MFN basis to all
countries (as arguedby some ASEAN countries), orjust to APEC partners
(as arguedinitially bythe United States).Bothsides maybewillingto accept
a liberalization objective that emphasizes regional benefits, but take no
position on whether or not countries should extend these benefits to third
parties.
How Muchto Expect
Suppose that criteria for assessingprogressare agreed upon, how
large isthe contribution that shouldbe expectedfrom eachcountryeach
year?APEC has notyet resolvedthisissue.One approachwouldbe to
requirereciprocity,or contributions thatareproportional tothe benefitsthe
offeringcountryexpectstoreceivefromothers.Thiswouldmean,however,
thata countrywitha very largelevelof initialbarrierswouldbe requiredto
make no greaterconcessions thanotherswith lowerbarriers.The single
most compellingprincipleis steady progress toward the Bogorgoals,
whichwouldrequireeach countrytospreadoutthe liberalization measures
requiredundertheBogortargetsproportionally acrossthe yearsleftbefore
2010 (or2020 fordevelopingcountries). Thecriterion(analyzedindetailin
Petri 1997)implies greaterburdensoncountrieswith highinitialbarriers
and alsorecognizesdifferencesineach country'sabilityto contribute,by
givingdevelopingcountries an additional10yearstodothejob.
Measurement in Practice
The measurementof APVA raisesdifficult practical issues.Mostana-
lyticalworkon protectionaddressesthe gainsofthe homecountry,rather
thanforeignpartners.Whilethegainsthatliberalizing 'countriesachieveat
• homeare perhapsthemostimportantpartoftheAPEC process,theAPVA
concept excludesthesegainsin orderto emphasizethe contributionsof
individualeconomiesto the APEC process.General equilibriummodels
can, in principle,calculategainsforpartners,buttheirstructureisusually
toosimpleto incorporatesomeofthemeasureslikelytobe important,and138 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
omits important channels of interaction, such as investment flows. Ander-
son and Neary (1994) propose an approach that lies roughly between
partialand full general equilibriummodelling. Greater investment in model-
ling East Asian linkages will be certainlyjustified as APEC gets underway,
but in the meantime simple approximations will have to be used.11
Aside from these difficulties, it is nevertheless possible to develop
APVA estimates for a wide range of initiatives in liberalizing and facilitating
economic cooperation and the exchange of goods, capital, services, tech-
nology and labor.TheAPVA implied bytrade liberalization can beapproxi-
mated byestimating the impactof a policychange onthe price ofan import,
and then multiplying this change with appropriate price elasticities. The
World Bank's (1989) Software for Market Analysis and Restrictions on
Trade (SMART) program works similar to APVA by calculating the trade
effects on developing countries of the concessions made by developed
countries in the Uruguay Round. With ingenuity, price impacts of policy
changes can be calculated including facilitation measures such as elec-
tronic customs clearance procedures or a "businessman's visa." In other
areas, econometric impact estimates may help; for example, international
regression models of the determinants of software sales could be used to
estimate the value-addedeffectsofintellectualproperty rightsenforcement.
In some cases, it may be easier to estimate the international price
differences that exist in the presenceof abarrier ratherthanto measure the
scale and implications ofthe barrier itself. Such indirect measurementswill
presumably complement direct assessmentsof impediments as the Bogor
processgatherssteam.Simpleand inexpensivecasestudies could beused
to determine the price effects of policy measures suchas the elimination of
duplicatecustomsforms. Comprehensivesurveysmay beconducted inturn
to determine price differences across APEC member-economies, particu-
larly in sectors such as services where protection is difficult to measure,
and analyze how these differences respond to policy changes over time.
Indeed, from the viewpoint of economic efficiency,it is more important that
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instruments oughtto be used to opena particulareconomy to international
competition.
PROSPECTS FOR LEADERSHIP IN APEC
Despitethe demonstratedinterestof the UnitedStates in EastAsia,the
recent history of the relationship has been stormy. Initially reluctant to
support any regional organization, the United States finally focused its
attention on APEC under President George Bushjust in the nick of time,
but then got sidetrackedagain in confrontationswith Japanand other trade
partners.The volatile, two-track approach---regional cooperation, bilateral
confrontation--continued into the early months of the Clinton administra*
tion, complicated by new theories for opening foreign markets with quanti-
tative targets.The Clintonadministration ultimatelyfought-and lost-poorly
chosen battles with China (over trade-human rights linkages) and Japan
(over numerical targets). In 1994, conflicts with China and Japan were
deescalated, and the U.S.approachtowardAPEC became moreinclusive;
the United States reduced its profile and worked closely with President
Siddharto Soeharto of Indonesia to achieve the extraordinary results of
Bogor.
Looking beyond Manila, the freedom of action of the U.S. Trade
Representative is considerably more limited than in the past. The ITAwas
a product of negotiating authority ("fast track") inherited from the UR
process -- the US government had some residual freedom to negotiate
certain "zero-for-zero" tariff elimination agreements in some sectors. Al-
though new fast-track legislation is now scheduled for debate in Congress
inthe fall of 1997and even if it is passed,new regionaltrade arrangements
are not likelytoenjoy the supportthat ledto NAFTAand the URagreements
•of 1993.With their authorityweakened, U.S.negotiators will needto share
leadership with other APEC member-countries. Most likely, the APEC
consensus will favor a flexible, gradual approach toward liberalization,
ratherthan a precommitted strategy.140 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
Ifthe role of United Statesdiminishes withinAPEC, where will APEC's
dynamism comefrom? Onecandidate isthe international policycommunity.
The business, research and academic communities cancall for action and
monitoring contributions to APEC much like the EPG did until 1995. The
EPG's high-profile, "insider" role facilitated this function, but eventually it
became a liability. The EPG became too prominent to ignore, and some
governments eventually saw it as a "runaway" forum for negotiations.With
the EPGnow disbanded, a wider networkof cd_-npetent, but not so central-
ized institutionscould provide intellectualleadership. The newAPEC Study
Centers may eventually play a role in this process. A second candidate is
the country that chairs APEC. The institution of the rotating chairmanship
is an important instrument for progress, because each country gets only
one chance,every 18years or so,to makeits markonhistory.Sofar,nearly
each host has madean extraordinary attempt to do so.
APEC has much to show for its eight years, but tough tests lie ahead.
The challenge for the United States is to participate in APEC's leadership,
and eventually to offer concessions itself, in order to promote progress
toward the goals of the Bogor Declaration.This will mean, at least in the
short run,sharing the limelightwith other regional powers.APEC is literally
and figuratively the first major international institution of the post-Commu-
nist era, and it is gradually reinventing the rules of international economic
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APPENDIX
THE CASE FORCONCERTED ACTION
Thedifferencesbetweenunilateraland multilateralactionscanbemore
rigorously identified in the following analytical framework. In Figure 1, a
country's policy optionsareclassifiedaccordingto theireffects ondomestic
and foreign constituents. Policies in Zone A create benefits both at home
and abroad. Those in Zone B and C create benefits at home, but harm
foreigners. In Zone B, domestic gains are larger than foreign losses (the
world as a whole benefits) but in Zone C the world loses. Policies in Zone
D harm everyone, while those in Zones E and F please only foreigners(in
Zone F,though, there are net world benefits).
If a country chooses policies unilaterally, it will implementonly policies
in Zones A, Band C. Yetglobal welfare maximizationrequiresthe adoption
of policies in Zones A, B and F.12Zone A policies will be adopted even in
a unilateralenvironment. Butacountry actingunilaterallywill alsoundertake
policiesthat reduce globalwelfare as long as it benefitsitself(ZoneC).And
itwill avoid policiesthat increaseglobal welfarewhen these harmitsnarrow
interests (ZoneF),hence,the scopeforCooperation.Cooperatingcountries
can agree to avoid Zone C and E (that is, forego "beggar thy neighbor"
policies) and to work for Zone B and F (or improve opportunities for
foreigners in orderto enjoy reciprocal benefits).
Zone A includes, for example, liberalization policeswhich create effi-
ciency gains at homeand also increasemarket demandforforeign produc-
ers. The mirror is self-defeating protectionism in Zone D. In between are
various cases such as "optimal tariffs," which generate gains at home at
the expense offoreigners (Zone Bor C). Preferentialtrading arrangements
between the homecountry and somethird country (say LatinAmerica,from
the viewpoint ofAPEC) could fall in Zone A (ifthere isnet trade creation for
both members and nonmembers), Zone B or F (if net gains for members
can compensate othersfor losses),Zone Cor E (if netgains are insufficient142 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
FIGURE 1







Zone D Zone F
Zone E
Zone A: Both countries benefit
Zone B: Home benefitexceeds partner's loss
Zone C: Partner's loss exceeds home benefit
Zone D: Both countries lose
Zone E: Home loss exceeds partner's benefit
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for compensation), or even Zone D (if net trade diversion causes losses
both at home and abroad).
This analysis suggests that countries need to coordinate actions to
achieve benefits beyond the range of unilateral policies. Coordination
requirestrust. For example, a countrywill give upgains in Zone C only if its
partnerwill reciprocate(which it should,since it has beensaved from harm
in Zone C). If the partner's actions are not easyto monitor,then the home
country has to trust its partner in order to give up Zone C.13Indeed, policy
actions could be ranked from those most likely to beadopted unilaterally
(ZonesA and B)tothose that requirethe most cooperationandtrust (Zones
Fand not C). APEC's early actions can addressthe unilateral end, but the
multilateral end will need to come into play as the Bogor targets are
approached. Along the way, countries need to develop trust to undertake
multilateral commitments. The "value added" of APEC derives not from
promoting measures that areso advantageousthat countrieswould pursue
them unilaterally anyway, but from measures that countries will undertake
only given cooperation from partners.144 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINEDEVELOPMENT
ENDNOTES
1. As initially proposed by Australia, APEC would have excluded the
United States. An early challenger to APEC, Malaysia's EastAsian Eco-
nomic Group (EAEG) would have excluded all Anglo-Saxon economies
from membership. These approaches now seem to be in retreat, as the
region's leaders are focusing on makingAPEC work.
2. The importance of foreign experience -- knowledge of foreign
business conditions and practices, investments in international business
networksand reputations-- is underscored bythe role of large institutions
in international transactions. Internationaltrade isoften intrafirm trade; it is
often mediated by big international banks (e.g., through letters of credit);
and it frequently involves consultants and trading companies.
3. Itisoften saidthat "theflagfollows trade." This isthe same argument
viewed in a different way. in the current economic climate, governments
focus their political relations on vigorous economic partnerships precisely
because they believe that political cooperation can help to stimulate the
intensification of trading relationships.
4. Robert B. Zoellick (1993).
5. Flocks of geese alternate leadership, probably in order to distribute
among all birds the energy expenditure required to break the air at the
leading edge of the flock. It is intriguing to speculate whether this mecha_
nism isalso appropriate in economic applications of the analogy.
6. Warren Christopher, "Pacific Economic Cooperation Ministerial In-
tervention," November 16, 1995.
7.Speech madeata conference organized byJETRO, Tokyo,October,
1996.
8. Unilateral decisions could even lead to negative outcomes by bene-
fitting the implementing country at the expense of regionalwelfare.
9. Alexander and Petri (1996).
10. European Commission (1988).
11.Thoughtful "rulesof thumb" that arefirst approximations togeneral
equilibrium results can provide a simpler and more transparent approachPETRIAND PLUMMER: U.S. AND ASIA-PACIFIC COOPERATION 145
tocalculating incomeeffects.An analysisofsuch rulesis beyondthe scope
of this paper, but examples for the case of trade liberalization include the
methodologies proposed bythe Institute for International Economics (Huf-
bauer, Berliner and Elliott 1986) or by Petri (1987).
12. Since Zone B and Zone F policies involve winners and losers,
without necessarilyany compensation, it cannotbe said thatworld welfare
is improved.
13. In the terminology of game theory, this is the familiar "prisoners'
dilemma," where the independent choices of players lead to inferior out-
comes. In repeated games, players can develop reputations of honesty,
which ultimately lead to superior outcomes for all sides.146 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
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